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This paper presents the final results of a research effort 
which investigated the effects of environmental/safety regulation 
on technological change in the U.S. chemical industry. (1) The 
term environmental/safety regulation is used to include the leg­
islation, regulations, and other related actions which attempt to 
control environmental pollution, protect worker health and safe­
ty, or ensure the safety of consumer products. Technological 
changes arising from regulation encompass both the immediate 
modifications in manufactured products or industrial processes 
which may be necessary in order to comply with regulation and the 
more indirect, or ancillary, effects regulation can have on tech­
nological change for non-regulatory, "main business" purposes. 
The major emphasis in this work is on technological change for 
compliance purposes. 
We distinguish technological change from innovation. Inno­
vation means new product or process technology actually brought 
by a firm into f i r s t commercial use. The term technological 
change has a broader scope and includes "non-innovative" changes 
such as the adoption of an existing technology. 
The study's focus was on the regulations and chemical tech­
nologies pertaining to: 
• lead 
• mercury 
• polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) 
• vinyl chloride. 
These are typical of substances that are in wide use and which 
are highly regulated. The choice was made to have a diversity of 
regulations and industrial contexts in our sample and to keep the 
study within manageable proportions. 
The study involved both the construction of a model of the 
effects of regulation on compliance technology and the testing of 
certain relationships, suggested by the model, concerning the 
characteristics of the regulation, the nature of the technology 
employed by the regulated/responding firms, and the ultimate 
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46 FEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION 
technological response. Data about these relationships were 
obtained from two series of interviews with firms subjected to 
the principal regulations on lead, mercury, PCB's, and vinyl 
chloride. 
Other Work on the Regulation-Technological Change Rela-
tionship. A 1975 literature survey of the chemical and all ied 
products industries concluded: 
Unfortunately, almost no work has appeared in the literature 
which has attempted to measure or even to model in a rigor-
ous way the impacts of environmental regulation on techno-
logical innovation. {2) 
Since that time, some important work has been concluded. In 
early 1979, as part of the Domestic Policy Review on Industrial 
Innovation undertaken by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the MIT 
Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA) undertook a systematic 
structuring of the effects of environmental/ safety regulation on 
innovation, citing support for different effects from the exist-
ing work. ( 3 J 
Although there are some broad, general studies and others 
specific to particular industries, within the chemical industry 
the most extensive literature concerns pharmaceutical innova-
tion. Several researchers have argued that regulation has unduly 
slowed the introduction of new drugs in the U.S. and has resulted 
in a net health disbenefit to consumers. (4,!5,6J However, a 
recent analysis of the literature presented at the 1977 HEW Panel 
on New Drug Regulation (the Dorsen Panel) has concluded that the 
available data are not sufficient to support such an assertion. 
(Z) 
Several new analyses have recently been offered concerning 
the general effects of regulation on innovation in chemicals. 
All stress the idea that the regulatory framework now applicable 
to the chemical industry has created a fundamental change in the 
business environment which will have important long-term impacts 
on the nature of innovation. Many of these impacts will be fe l t 
through the level and nature of R&D support. One study based on 
industry interviews has found a decline in real R&D spending in 
general but a large increase in R&D devoted to environmental 
control. (8) Others see the regulations as having a very uneven 
impact across the industry, providing some firms with a lucrative 
market opportunity and penalizing others. (9) Another study 
(10), based on unstructured chemical industry interviews and 
concerned mostly with the R&D effects, found considerable innova-
tion in control technology arising from the research devoted to 
environmental amelioration but a general "dampening influence" on 
other new product and process development in large chemical com-
panies. Changes in corporate organizational structure are con-
sistently cited in all the studies. 
Taken as a whole, the existing studies are useful in provid-
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4. ASHFORD AND HEATON Health and Environmental Regulations 47 
ing some general insights into the nature of the impacts regula-
tion can have upon technological change and in sometimes provid-
ing documentation of those impacts in specific industries. How-
ever, they can only be characterized as a beginning exploration 
of the regulation-technological change relationship. A funda-
mental fai l ing which pervades most of the studies is that they do 
not pose or rest upon any articulated model of the relationship 
between regulation and innovation. Many of the studies are 
broad, general overviews. On the other hand, the few industry 
studies which exist have only limited generalizability. What 
results from this lack of conceptual framework is that the pre-
vious work lacks both precision and subtlety. The regulatory 
stimulus is typically considered as a single, uniform event or 
signal; in reality, different regulations are vastly different in 
purpose and form and therefore can be expected to have s igni f i -
cantly different effects. Similarly, innovation tends to be 
treated as a simple phenomenon. L i t t le attempt is made to dis-
tinguish between innovation for compliance purposes and innova-
tion for general corporate purposes. Lastly, the studies are 
rarely rigorously constructed to yield valid statistical re-
sults. Rather, they are typically surveys of a general nature 
which try to make a beginning exploration in an il l-defined 
research area. 
A General View of the Regulation-Technological Change Rela-
tionship. It is essential to distinguish between two separate 
effects of regulation on technological change — the technolog-
ical changes necessary for compliance purposes and the other, 
ancillary changes in technology which may also result. This 
distinction highlights an important premise of this research — 
that it is unwise to attempt to draw general conclusions about 
the regulation-technological change relationship. Too much 
depends on the characteristics of individual cases — in parti-
cular, the form of the regulation, the kind of industry, and the 
peculiar character of the firm affected. Thus, one of the few 
certainties in this area is that there are no simple, general 
answers. Most of the answers l ie in particular cases. 
When one considers the technology developed for compliance 
purposes, it is clear that regulation encourages technological 
change. Indeed, this is almost a tautology since regulation is 
intended to ameliorate the adverse consequences of technology by 
changing technology i tself . Certainly, the existence of a vigor-
ous pollution control industry attests to the fact that the regu-
lations have an important expansive effect. In these instances 
regulation creates a new market opportunity, which can be met 
very profitably by some firms. In some cases, the regulated firm 
markets the compliance technology. 
On the other hand, regulation, imposes a direct constraint 
upon technological change. Certain regulatory systems are in-
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48 FEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION 
tended to discourage some innovations in the sense that the regu-
lators must refuse to allow the introduction of certain unsafe 
products. Moreover, all regulation forecloses or discourages 
certain technical options and therefore constrains to some degree 
the innovation process. 
Another regulatory constraint to innovation, but one which 
is indirect, may occur as a result of the cost of environmental 
control. To the extent that the costs of environmental control 
divert resources away from other corporate activities, like R&D, 
and to the extent that innovation is directly related to the 
level of these resources, regulation is likely to penalize inno-
vative activity. 
Regulation may also indirectly stimulate innovation. Often, 
firms respond creatively to crises, and to the extent that regu-
lation poses crisis conditions it may foster innovative res-
ponses. This appears to be the case particularly in older, non-
innovative firms which, prior to regulation, fe l t no need to 
innovate. 
A last kind of effect may result from a basic change in the 
nature of the business environment created by the "new regula-
tion". This is a systemic effect which will significantly affect 
the ski l l mix of chemical firms, their R&D processes, and their 
general business strategy. These effects in turn have important, 
though s t i l l largely unpredictable, effects on the nature (as 
well as the outcome) of the innovation process in the chemical 
industry. 
A Conceptual Model of Regulation-Induced Technological Responses 
In its simplest terms, our model of the regulation-
technological change relationship consists of three basic ele-
ments: 
t the regulatory stimulus 
• the responding industrial unit 
• the technological response 
Regulation may impinge on a regulated firm and, as a result, a 
response of some kind is el ic ited. A responding industrial unit 
to that regulation may not be the regulated firm. It might be a 
supplier; it might be a new entrant to the f ie ld. It is impor-
tant to identify the unit that sees a market signal or a con-
straint and responds in some measure. Depending on the kind of 
regulation and the characteristics of the responding unit or the 
regulated unit, different responses can result. 
The Regulatory Stimulus. The term regulation brings to mind 
a governmental edict, such as a piece of legislation, an agency 
rule, or a guideline. Similarly, the concept of a regulatory 
stimulus to technological change suggests that such change occurs 
as a result of a regulation. After completing this research, we 
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4. ASHFORD AND HEATON Health and Environmental Regulations 49 
have concluded that both of these commonly held conceptions are 
too simple. 
In the environmental/safety context, "regulation" should be 
given a broad meaning. It should include all forces (both gov-
ernmental and non-governmental) that are related to the govern-
mental effort to ameliorate environmental or safety problems. 
The reason for adopting this broad definition of regulation is 
that any narrower concept (e.g. one limited to legislation and 
Federal agency rules) is not real ist ic and would impute more 
causality to a single government action than is in fact the 
case. In short, the regulatory process is complex, and should be 
viewed as such. 
There are many "regulatory" stimuli faced by the firm. Some 
regulations appear to pose l i t t l e , if any, stimulus because they 
are based upon industry consensus and thus simply ratify into law 
the existing practice of the majority of firms. Similarly, to 
the extent that regulations are based upon concepts like "feasi-
b i l i ty" or "best available technology", they may be rooted close-
ly to the technological status quo as it exists in at least some 
firms. Accordingly, regulation often stimulates change in only 
part of the industry. Moreover, the regulatory stimulus is often 
not responsible for ( i .e., does not require) all of the techno-
logical changes which occur. Indeed, regulation often gives 
firms the opportunity to make needed modernizations. Although 
these changes would not have occurred but for the regulatory 
stimulus, it is not proper to relate them to that stimulus 
alone. Not only is the regulatory stimulus complex, but it also 
interacts in a complex way with other economic, technological and 
social stimuli. 
A f i r s t important aspect of the regulatory stimulus is what 
part of the technology the regulation focuses on. There are 
three principal classes of regulation important for the regula-
t i on-technolog i cal change relationship : 
• product regulation — focusing on product character-
istics 
• pollutant regulation — focusing on unwanted side 
products from production 
processes 
• component regulation — focusing on individual elements 
of the production process 
A second important aspect of the regulatory stimulus is its 
purpose or kind. Obviously, it is to be expected that occupa-
tional safety and health regulation, for example, will produce 
different kinds of changes from water pollution control or pesti-
cide regulation. Similarly, it is important to distinguish among 
differing operational mechanisms or modes of regulation, such as 
performance vs. specification standards, or tax incentives vs. 
mandatory standards. 
Other characteristics of regulation appear to have an impor-
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50 FEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION 
tant influence on the nature of technological changes. The 
stringency of regulation, measured by its cost or by the degree 
of change it requires, is obviously a major determinant of the 
kinds of changes which result. Similarly, when there are a 
multiplicity of regulatory stimuli rather than a single event, 
the resulting change may be greater, other things being equal. 
Characteristics of the regulatory process may also be impor-
tant in determining the resulting technological changes. For 
example, close participation of industrial representatives with 
government off icials in drafting standards often appears to 
result in regulating at a level which is clearly feasible with 
existing technology, thus requiring l i t t l e change. The length of 
time within which the regulatory scenario takes place also is 
important in allowing for appropriate responses, as is time-
phasing of the regulation. Contrastingly, too much uncertainty 
is often seen as inhibiting the most efficient compliance ef-
forts. Also, it is clear that most regulations tend to change 
over time and that the form of their changing requirements is 
closely linked to the evolution of compliance technology. 
The Responding Unit or Units. The person who has the legal 
duty to comply with regulation is called the legally bound 
party. However, the legally bound party may not be the responder 
to regulation because the legal obligation does not always pro-
vide the most important stimulus to respond. For example, there 
may be joint responses to regulation by more than one firm or 
industry. 
A productive unit is the smallest production element employ-
ing a particular technology that could conceivably stand alone as 
an individual firm. It may be a firm or only part of a firm. 
For example, a single PVC polymerization plant (or part of a 
larger plant) would constitute a productive unit. 
The group of firms or units within firms that employ a par-
ticular technology can be termed a productive segment. For exam-
ple, all the firms that polymerize vinyl chloride would consti-
tute a productive segment. 
The productive segment whose technology is the target of a 
regulation is called the regulated segment. This concept in-
cludes productive segments not legally bound to comply but which 
are nevertheless so commonly and closely related economically to 
the legally bound segment that they can legitimately be included 
within the regulated segment. (For example, the lead-in-gasoline 
regulations technically apply primarily to marketers of gasoline; 
however, the lead additive manufacturers are so closely linked 
that both would be considered regulated segments.) Non-regulated 
segments are defined as productive segments not within the regu-
lated segment that is responding to the regulation. 
Regulation may be seen as imposing requirements on techno-
logies used in industry. We have attempted in this research to 
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4. ASHFORD AND HEATON Health and Environmental Regulations 51 
categorize these technologies. The most important aspect of a 
technology for this categorization is the concept of technolog-
ical r igidity. This is defined as a continuum that has at one 
extreme evolving (fluid) product lines and uncoordinated produc-
tion technologies, and at the other extreme, mature, commodity-
like products and highly integrated, cost-effective production 
technologies. Productive segments may be placed along the con-
tinuum of rigidity according to a set of objective cr iter ia which 
describe their technology. 
To simplify the analysis, we have separated the continuum of 
rigidity into three distinct stages: f l u i d , segmented and 
rigid segments. The concept of r igidity used in this work is 
related to, but not identical with, that of Abernathy and Utter-
back. (11,12) They visualize an evolutionary process whereby 
product and process technology develop together from an in i t ia l 
stage in which the product is poorly defined and rapidly changing 
and the process is uncoordinated and based on general purpose 
equipment, through an intermediate stage in which the product 
begins to standardize and portions of the process are automated 
and optimized, to a final stage in which the product is a highly 
standardized commodity and the process is automated, integrated 
and large scale. Utterback and Abernathy's work suggests that 
the likely future pattern of change can be predicted based on the 
recent past. If units respond to regulation in the same way that 
other technological changes are undertaken, then this work would 
suggest that the particular kind of compliance response might be 
determined by the technological r igidity of the responding seg-
ment. 
The Technological Response. In analysis of regulation-
induced technological change, we distinguish between (1) res-
ponses which are primarily for compliance purposes ("compliance 
responses"), and (2) responses which primarily affect the devel-
opment of technology for "main business" purposes ("ancillary 
responses"). The compliance response consists of those technical 
modifications to a firm's products or processes that are neces-
sary for it to comply with a regulatory mandate. They also in-
clude non-hardware changes, such as changes in R&D, that are 
related to the development of compliance technology, as well as 
unsuccessful technological changes. 
The important characteristics of the compliance response 
chosen for investigation in this study were: 
• whether the response is principally a product or pro-
cess change 
• the "stage of development" of the response 
• the "novelty" of the response 
• the "comprehensiveness" of the response 
The "ancillary" responses are the technological changes that 
occur in firms as a result of regulation that are not required 
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52 FEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION 
for compliance with regulatory requirements. They are the devel-
opments that would not have occurred in the absence of regula-
tion. They include the development of innovations within a com-
pany's "main business." There are two basic kinds of ancillary 
responses. One we have called "product- or process-specific" be-
cause it includes new or existing industrial products or pro-
cesses directly traceable to a compliance response; the other we 
have termed "systemic," because it results from changes in the 
corporate structure or environment within which innovation occurs. 
Relationships Within the Model. As discussed above, the 
concept of a productive segment is fundamentally a characteriza-
tion of a technology. A basic postulate of this research is that 
the characteristics of a productive segment's technology are 
important determinants of its technological response to regula-
tion, along with the characteristics of the regulatory stimulus. 
The model constructed during the course of this research, 
relating the regulatory stimulus, the regulated/responding unit, 
and the technological response, is presented in Figure 1. In the 
figure, the elements of the model that are connected with solid 
lines are those which were the main focus of the research. The 
elements connected by dashed lines are those about which less 
information was collected. Hypotheses were developed concerning 
those elements connected only with solid lines. Figure 2 is a 
schematic of the specific relationships which were investigated. 
The hypotheses tested in this research were as follows: 
• Responses to regulation from the regulated segment will 
be predominantly product or process in a proportion 
corresponding to the expected pattern of innovation in 
the segment in the absence of regulation. 
• All responses to regulation (whether or not from the 
regulated segment) will be predominantly product or 
process in a proportion corresponding to the expected 
pattern of innovation in the regulated segment in the 
absence of regulation. 
t A large proportion of responses to regulation will 
arise from inside the regulated segment and inside the 
legally bound firm. 
• A greater percentage of product responses than process 
responses will arise from outside the regulated segment. 
• A much greater percentage of product responses than 
process responses will arise from outside the legally 
bound segment. 
t Most responses to regulation are in a late stage of 
development and require only moderate development. 
t Product responses will tend to be in somewhat earlier 
stages of development than process responses. 
• Almost all responses will be in the "least novel" cate-
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 M
A
SS
A
CH
U
SE
TT
S 
IN
ST
 O
F 
TE
CH
N
O
LO
G
Y
 o
n 
M
ay
 2
2,
 2
01
8 
| ht
tps
://p
ubs
.ac
s.o
rg
 
Pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
D
at
e:
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 5
, 1
97
9 
| do
i: 1
0.1
021
/bk
-19
79-
010
9.c
h00
4
 Hill; Federal Regulation and Chemical Innovation 
ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1979. 
ASHFORD AND HEATON Health and Environmental Regulations 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 M
A
SS
A
CH
U
SE
TT
S 
IN
ST
 O
F 
TE
CH
N
O
LO
G
Y
 o
n 
M
ay
 2
2,
 2
01
8 
| ht
tps
://p
ubs
.ac
s.o
rg
 
Pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
D
at
e:
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 5
, 1
97
9 
| do
i: 1
0.1
021
/bk
-19
79-
010
9.c
h00
4
 Hill; Federal Regulation and Chemical Innovation 
ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1979. 
αχ
 
St
ag
e 
o
f 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
M
 
8 
of
 
Re
sp
on
se
 
9
/ 
Re
gu
la
ti
on
 
No
ve
lt
y 
of
 
Re
sp
on
se
 
Co
mp
re
he
ns
 i 
ve
ne
ss
 
of
 
Re
sp
on
se
 
Pr
od
uc
t 
Po
ll
ut
an
t 
Co
mp
on
en
t 
o
f 
Ph
ys
ic
al
 
Pl
an
t 
^^
Re
sg
on
se
^ 
Pr
od
uc
t 
Re
sp
on
se
 
(i
nc
lu
di
ng
 
at
te
nd
an
t 
pr
oc
es
s 
ch
an
ge
s)
 
Pr
oc
es
s 
Re
sp
on
se
 
Na
tu
re
 
o
f 
Re
gu
la
te
d 
Se
gm
en
t 
Fl
ui
d,
 
Se
gm
en
te
d,
 
o
r 
Ri
gi
d 
F
ig
ur
e 
2.
 
Sc
he
m
at
ic
 o
f r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
 
o^
^e
s£
on
is
e e
 
Le
ga
ll
y 
Bo
un
d 
la
te
d,
 
Jo
in
t,
 
Re
gu
la
te
d 
No
t 
Le
ga
ll
y 
Bo
un
d 
s M r w ο > δ > α ο a M ο H-I Ο H δ 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 M
A
SS
A
CH
U
SE
TT
S 
IN
ST
 O
F 
TE
CH
N
O
LO
G
Y
 o
n 
M
ay
 2
2,
 2
01
8 
| ht
tps
://p
ubs
.ac
s.o
rg
 
Pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
D
at
e:
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 5
, 1
97
9 
| do
i: 1
0.1
021
/bk
-19
79-
010
9.c
h00
4
 Hill; Federal Regulation and Chemical Innovation 
ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1979. 
4. ASHFORD AND HEATON Health and Environmental Regulations 55 
gory, with occasional moderately novel responses and 
very few novel responses. 
• Novelty will be equally as likely for product and pro-
cess responses. 
• In f luid segments, the response to regulation is more 
likely to come from an earlier stage of development 
than in rigid segments. 
• The responses to regulation will be less novel, the 
more rigid the segment. 
t Responses will tend to be more comprehensive, the more 
rigid the segment. 
Description of Empirical Procedures 
The research was divided into three phases: 
• Phase I: An in i t ia l taxonomic exercise in which basic 
concepts of the regulation-technological change rela-
tionship were developed from f i r s t principles and 
existing literature 
• Phase II: Pilot in-depth in-person interviews with a 
small number of leading companies believed to have made 
important technological responses to regulations on 
four extensively regulated chemical hazards 
• Phase III: Focused telephone interviews with randomly-
selected companies in the same industries studied dur-
ing Phase II. 
The Phase I survey of the diverse legislative mandates ap-
plicable to the chemical and allied products industry revealed 
that almost all of the individual environmental/safety regula-
tions are substance-specific. Accordingly, we organized the 
study around a series of candidate hazard regulations which would 
provide case studies of how the productive segments concerned 
with the selected hazards responded technologically to regulation. 
A search of the regulations promulgated in each of the major 
legislative areas yielded a large l i s t of chemicals which had 
been the subject of at least some governmental action. This l i s t 
was reduced in several stages to a final group of four hazards - -
lead, mercury, PCB's, and vinyl chloride — which we're (1) sub-
ject to a diversity of regulatory actions of different kinds and 
modes which significantly restricted production or methods of 
use, (2) used in a number of different productive segments within 
the chemical industry, and (3) economically important in a number 
of uses. 
In Phase II, the goal of our interviews was to develop 
hypotheses about the factors important in shaping technological 
responses to regulation and about the characteristics of the 
actual responses. To faci l i tate this task, the sample of firms 
for the pilot interviews was deliberately enriched with firms 
that were known to have made relatively innovative technical 
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responses to the regulation(s) in question and by firms that were 
relatively easy to study because they were receptive to inter-
views and located in convenient geographic areas. The sample of 
firms was drawn from 12 productive segments where the four sub-
ject hazards were principally in use. 
Interviews were conducted with 10 firms. (Because some 
firms spanned more than one productive segment, we were able to 
gain information about all twelve productive segments.) Inter-
views of about two hours' duration were conducted by two members 
of the study team with one to four people from the firm. The 
discussions were informal and flexible in order to allow the 
interviewees ample latitude to enlighten us about the aspects of 
the regulations covered, the industry, and the technical res-
ponses which they considered particularly significant. In all 
cases, the interviewees performed one (or both) of the following 
functions in the firm: 
(i) management of the details of the compliance response 
( i.e., the product or process change needed for com-
pliance) 
( i i) management of the overall firm response to regulation, 
including contact with the agencies, securing clearance 
for expenditures from corporate management, providing 
directions to the technical group, etc. 
Phase III contained the major part of our empirical work. 
Its goal was to ascertain whether or not the hypotheses developed 
from the Phase II interviews and our model of the regulation-
technological change relationship would be reinforced or altered 
by information derived from a more representative sampling of 
companies within productive segments. To construct the interview 
sample, we f i r s t arranged ten of the original twelve productive 
segments that had been directly subject to regulatory action in a 
matrix according to: (i) the characteristics of the segment's 
technology ( i .e., r igidity/f luidity) and ( i i ) the primary type of 
regulation ( i.e., product/pollutant), affecting the segment. 
Next, l ists of companies in each productive segment were 
compiled, and up to 16 companies per productive segment were 
randomly selected and arranged in a priority order for inter-
views. These ordered l ists were then used to call companies; 
roughly equal numbers of usable interviews were obtained in each 
cell of the matrix. This procedure resulted in a sample that was 
stratified according to the two major foci of our investigation 
( i .e., technology and regulatory characteristics). 
Forty Phase III interviews were conducted by telephone. The 
Phase III interviews were much shorter and more focused than 
those in Phase II, generally lasting less than thirty minutes. 
In addition they proceeded according to a rather specific ques-
tionnaire. In some cases it was possible to combine information 
from Phase II and Phase III interviews for analytical purposes. 
The survey instrument consisted of a set of ten questions 
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which resulted in ten specific replies out of 33 possible replies 
in an interview. For example, one question which was used to 
determine the nature of the productive segment of the respondents 
resulted in one of three replies f lu id, segmented, or r igid. 
In Phase II and III of the project there were 50 interviews and 
these interviews provided 121 sets of ten replies. Each set of 
replies is focused on a firm's response to regulation. A res-
ponse was a particular set of actions directed toward meeting the 
requirements of the regulation. On the average, firms exhibited 
three responses to regulation and industrial segments exhibited 
twelve responses. The analysis presented here describes inter-
relationships among variables related to the 33 possible replies 
— drawn from appropriately aggregated responses of the indus-
tr ia l segments. The nature of the data collected led to a number 
of complexities for analysis. The interested reader is referred 
to the final report of the project for a detailed discussion. (]) 
Summary of Major Findings and Conclusions 
The conceptual framework developed for this research was 
valuable as a structuring device and seems to be an accurate 
description of compliance behavior. We feel that the model ar t i -
culates most of the important aspects of the regulation-
technological change relationship on an individual firm level and 
should serve as a basis for further empirical research. 
The Regulatory Stimulus. The regulatory stimulus is a very 
complex, time-dependent and variable signal. Regulation is not a 
simple, single point-in-time phenomenon that e l ic i ts an indus-
tr ia l response. Various "regulatory" signals — research find-
ings, advance notice of rule-making, informal agency-industry 
contacts, etc. — all influence firm behavior. Moreover, regula-
tory demands often change substantially over time, particularly 
as compliance technology changes. The way regulatory signals are 
perceived by the firm is also very important. These perceptions 
may sometimes differ quite substantially from those in the agen-
cies and may even be incorrect as to the regulatory requirements. 
Informal "regulatory" stimuli are as important, or more so, 
than formalized rulemaking. Informal stimuli include publicity, 
government scrutiny, non-regulatory legal mechanisms like tort 
and contract law, and customer (or supplier) pressure. These 
additional forces tend to multiply the effect of regulation, and 
sometimes even preclude the need for regulation. The example of 
PCB's best illustrates this point. Only government "scrutiny" 
had occurred by 1970 when Monsanto, the sole U.S. producer, began 
restricting production. Fear of tort suits and adverse publicity 
were major motivators for action by PCB users long before the 
passage of the Toxic Substances Control Act in 1976, which 
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phased-in a ban on PCB production. 
In part because of the extra-regulatory forces at work, it 
is clear that compliance with regulatory goals may sometimes 
substantially pre-date actual promulgation of a rule. In such 
cases, the actual regulation serves the function of ratifying 
action that has already occurred and provides a model for similar 
requirements which might be mandated in the future. Forces other 
than regulation are thus the major stimuli for technological 
change in these instances. 
We have also seen consistently that agencies use substantial 
industry input in drafting regulations. This input results from 
industry participation in the formalized rule-making process as 
well as through informal contacts with agency personnel. Indus-
try input appears to be dominated by the large firms (and trade 
associations) which employ a variety of full-time specialists to 
handle regulatory affairs. The agencies often adopt the sugges-
tions offered in comment on their rules. For example, the CPSC's 
final rule on lead-in-paint was modified substantially (princi-
pally as to the breadth of its application) on the basis of hear-
ing comments. 
For the four hazardous materials surveyed, the actual stan-
dards which f inal ly emerged from the regulatory process appear in 
most instances to be based largely on considerations of techno-
logical feasibi l i ty or best available technology. It was rare to 
observe a standard set to require technology not already in use 
by at least some firms, although we did observe this in one im-
portant instance. (The OSHA vinyl chloride regulations apparent-
ly required a series of innovative process modifications for v ir -
tually all firms in the VC polymerization industry.) This is not 
to say, however, that a standard cannot successfully bring about 
changes in technology. The change may either be the development 
of an entirely new product or process - - or the diffusion of a 
given technology throughout an industrial segment. More recent 
regulatory initiatives, relying on stringent health-based c r i -
teria, may well require technological responses which go beyond 
current capability. 
There is, as expected, a very strong correlation between the 
type of regulation and the nature of the technological response. 
Thus, "product" regulation generally leads to a product response, 
and "pollutant" and "component" regulations generally lead to 
process responses. In a few cases, however, product regulation 
was seen to e l i c i t primarily a process change. For example, the 
petroleum refiners' principal response to regulatory limits on 
the lead content in gasoline has been to increase catalytic re-
forming, a process change. 
We suspect that other characteristics of the regulatory s t i -
mulus not investigated here in detail or systematically are also 
important for technological change. They include the stringency 
of the regulatory demands, the time period allowed for the com-
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pliance response to develop, the mode of regulation (e.g. perfor-
mance vs. specification standards), and the presence or absence 
of several regulatory demands in combination. 
The Responding Units. We conclude that the characteristics 
of the technology in productive segments/units are major factor? 
determining the nature of the technological response to regula-
tion. The technology in use before regulation tends to dominate 
the compliance response to regulation. Variations among individ-
ual firms were found, but overall, responses were fa ir ly predict-
able across a productive segment. 
Other more specific findings supported this basic conclu-
sion. First, we found that the kinds of technical changes that 
firms within a productive segment made in order to comply with~~a 
given regulation were highly uniform. This uniformity cannot be 
attributed to regulatory signals which required a single com-
pliance technology because most of the regulations investigated 
were performance standards. Rather, the response uniformity 
within productive segments suggests that the character of the 
existing technology does indeed dominate the response. 
Second, we found that the proportion of product and process 
responses to regulation closely resembles the expected balance of 
product/process innovations occurring in the segment in the ab-
sence of regulation. Thus, we saw that f luid industries tended 
to respond to regulation with product modifications, and rigid 
segments tended to have more process responses than product 
changes. Segmented industries, in contrast, exhibited both 
product and process changes and a greater overall amount of 
change than f luid or rigid segments. These responses are highly 
consistent with the usual pattern of innovation in the absence of 
regulation. 
Perhaps the most interesting result concerns the relation-
ship between the novelty of the response and the rigidity of the 
segment. Regulation of rigid segments often elicited responses 
as novel as those in f luid segments. For example, highly innova-
tive responses were attempted, but unsuccessfully, to deal with 
the lead-in-gas regulations. These included the development of 
an entirely new fuel, "gasohol," and efforts by the lead alkyl 
manufacturers to develop new automobile engine designs capable of 
using leaded gas. On the other hand, the response to lead-in-
paint regulations by paint manufacturers (a f luid industry) was 
simply to uti l ize existing substitutes. This finding lends some 
support to the idea that regulation can change the overall char-
acter of innovation in rigid industries. Creative responses to 
regulation may occur especially when the regulation precipitates 
"cr is is" conditions for the industry. 
Regulatory requirements are typically made applicable to a 
specific industry or industries. Nevertheless, the response to 
regulation need not arise from the regulated segment or the 
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legally-bound firm. Although we have found that a large prepon-
derance of responses will arise from inside the regulated seg-
ment, the responses from outside the regulated segment are also 
significant. Several very important, innovative responses were 
seen to have arisen from new entrants to the industry, whose 
entry was made possible by regulation. For example, successful 
PCB substitutes arose from large oil and chemical companies, 
transformer/capacitor manufacturers, and foreign corporations ~ 
none of whom had been in the PCB manufacturing business. 
When responses do arise from outside of the regulated seg-
ment or the legally-bound firm, they s t i l l require some kind of 
adaptation or modification by the firm undertaking compliance. 
Thus, responses from outside the regulated segment or firm are 
typically joint efforts. 
Although there are examples of both product and process 
responses arising outside of the regulated segment, a greater 
percentage of process responses arose from outside efforts than 
for product responses. There appears to be some tendency for 
rigid firms that are legally bound to look elsewhere for the 
compliance solution, and some tendency for f luid firms that are 
legally bound to develop their own compliance solution. There 
are several important examples of the suppliers to regulated 
firms actually providing the technical solution to their cus-
tomer's regulatory compliance problem. In one such case, the 
worker exposure and emissions problems of PVC fabricators were 
essentially solved by the PVC polymerizers, their suppliers. The 
polymerizers' production of "clean resins" largely eliminated the 
potential for emission of vinyl chloride monomer during fabrica-
tion. 
The Characteristics of Compliance Responses. Most techno-
logical responses to regulation are in a late stage of develop-
ment and require only moderate development in order to achieve 
compliance. This means that when the response to regulation was 
begun there was, in most cases, an existing technology which 
could be adapted to the regulatory purpose without the need for 
major research/development work. (For example, in the mercury 
chloralkali industry there were two principal production pro-
cesses in use, one of which was a significant mercury polluter. 
Regulations on mercury have prompted a diffusion of the second 
process.) Thus, one might say that most responses were drawn 
from technology already "on the shelf". 
Comparing product and process responses, it was found that 
product responses tended to be in somewhat earlier stages of 
development. 
It appears equally l ikely that rigid and f luid segment res-
ponses will require substantial development, although we expected 
that the responses of f luid segments would be drawn from an 
earlier stage of development than the responses of rigid seg-
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 M
A
SS
A
CH
U
SE
TT
S 
IN
ST
 O
F 
TE
CH
N
O
LO
G
Y
 o
n 
M
ay
 2
2,
 2
01
8 
| ht
tps
://p
ubs
.ac
s.o
rg
 
Pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
D
at
e:
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 5
, 1
97
9 
| do
i: 1
0.1
021
/bk
-19
79-
010
9.c
h00
4
 Hill; Federal Regulation and Chemical Innovation 
ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1979. 
4. ASHFORD AND HEATON Health and Environmental Regulations 61 
merits. After reconsideration of the original expectations, this 
finding appears to be consistent with the theory that regulation 
has the effect of disrupting established modes of operation in 
rigid segments, and thereby e l ic i ts creative responses. 
We found that almost all responses to regulation fe l l into 
the "least novel" category. This finding is consistent with the 
earlier finding that responses tended to be drawn from a late 
stage of development. It was also found that product and process 
responses were approximately equally novel (or non-novel). 
Tests of the relationship between novelty and technological 
r igidity provided especially interesting results. The most novel 
responses seem to come from segmented firms, although we had 
expected that responses would be most novel in f lu ia segments. 
Moreover, it appears clear that rigid firms do not have less 
novel responses than f luid firms. Again, this finding supports 
the idea that rigid firms are prompted to develop creative solu-
tions to severe regulatory problems. (Perhaps the principal 
example of segmented firm innovation comes from the vinyl chlo-
ride polymerizers, who modified their process in several impor-
tant ways in responding to OSHA and EPA regulations. This res-
ponse, especially the unique combination of responses, was per-
ceived as remarkable by many in the industry, which had feared 
that the regulatory demands could not be met.) 
No general relationship appears evident between comprehen-
siveness and product versus process change. It was found, how-
ever, that responses tended to be more comprehensive in more 
f luid segments. This finding appears consistent with the idea 
that f luid technologies, being relatively undefined (as opposed 
to rigid segments) are able to make a greater degree of change 
with more ease. 
Qualitatively, the data show only a very few examples of 
radically new technologies arising in response to regulation. 
These few arose outside of the regulated segment and were in most 
cases, ultimately unsuccessful. (As mentioned above, "gasohol" 
has not succeeded nor have automotive design changes like "lead 
traps," etc.) However, successful responses did in some in-
stances show a creative adaptation of existing techniques. For 
example, the development of MMT, a manganese-based fuel additive 
that now has been in commercial use for several years (although 
it recently was denied continued use by EPA) built creatively 
upon the research which had taken place several decades ago. 
Most responses were developed over a relatively short time 
period. This perception is consistent with the finding that most 
responses were relatively non-novel and drawn from a rather late 
stage of development. 
Systemic Changes. Although this study did not attempt to 
measure systemic changes in any rigorous way, we nevertheless 
were impressed by the assertion of many interviewees that the 
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character of their business had changed as a result of environ-
mental regulation. 
An important phenomenon reported in several instances is the 
ability of new entrants to capitalize upon opportunities created 
by regulatory demands. This may occur, for example, when pro-
ducts are banned or when an existing process technology is 
severely restricted. (For example, mercury has long been the 
most important biocide for paint uses. The regulations on this 
use have elicited several new non-mercurial products, sometimes 
from companies not previously in the industry.) New entrants may 
thus be competitively advantaged by the opportunity to comply 
with regulations. 
Systemic changes were investigated quantitatively via ques-
tions about environmental affairs groups in the firms. About 65% 
of interviewed firms had such groups. Although the primary pur-
pose of environmental affairs units appears to be to aid the 
direct compliance effort, their new capabilities may have impor-
tant long-term implications for the pattern of innovation in the 
primary lines of business.' 
Most of the environmental affairs groups had as their p r i -
mary purpose a liaison function between the regulators and their 
company. They participated regularly in the regulatory process, 
often indicating to the regulatory agencies the technical limits 
of existing compliance capability. Inside the firm, the environ-
mental affairs unit often functioned in a manner very similar to 
a regulatory agency. Specifically, environmental review proce-
dures were often established, with the environmental affairs unit 
able to "pass" on the acceptability of various products or pro-
cesses, particularly in their early stages of development. Thus, 
these groups are likely to be an important force for the produc-
tion of safer products and process technologies. 
Environmental affairs units appear to be more common in 
larger corporations. They are typically located in the central 
corporate headquarters rather than in production fac i l i t ie s . 
They may be staffed with young environmental scientists rather 
than engineers. As such, it appears they often do not play a 
major role in the development of new compliance technology or in 
the engineering aspects of compliance. These latter functions 
are more typically within the realm of the plant-level engineers 
or R&D personnel. 
Another widely reported phenomenon was a change in the 
skill-mix in firms in order to give them the new capabilities and 
expertise to comply with regulation. One change, widely report-
ed, is the improvement in analytical chemistry capability. This 
was made necessary by regulation but, of course, aids companies 
generally in establishing better the properties of their products 
and finding new uses for them. The effect of interjecting new 
technical ski l ls into regulated firms is di f f icult to assess. To 
the extent that these new personnel are concentrated in environ-
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mental affairs units, their impact on abatement technologies is 
likely to be no different from that discussed above. However, we 
are also left with the impression that new ski l ls and a new envi-
ronmental awareness are being absorbed by engineers and that this 
may have a profound impact both on abatement technology and other 
innovations. Many interviewees at the plant level indicated that 
their jobs were very different since environmental regulation. 
Some said this begrudgingly, but others said they now found the 
work more "challenging and exciting." 
Ancillary Changes. "Ancillary responses" to regulation are 
technological changes that occur as a result of regulation but 
which are not necessary in order to bring those firms into com-
pliance with regulatory requirements. 
Ancillary changes were investigated by a simple direct ques-
tion to the interviewees. Approximately 20% stated that there 
had been ancillary innovations resulting from regulation. These 
innovations benefitted the company in areas not related to com-
pliance. Ancillary responses included: development of a new 
catalyst for petroleum refining; in i t ia l development of a new 
chlorine manufacturing process; increased yields of PVC resin; 
better process monitoring techniques for PVC polymerization; and 
new paint formulations. 
More work needs to be done in the investigation of ancillary 
responses. However, we do feel that their existence is beyond 
doubt. One of the problems in investigating ancillary responses 
arises from the fact that they are very diffuse and indirect 
and not likely to be appreciated ful ly by any single individual 
in the firm. Indeed this fact was cited often by interviewees in 
response to our questions. 
Other Conclusions. Although no systematic attempt was made 
to assess the level of compliance with regulatory requirements, 
the interviewers were left with a very strong feeling that firms 
are substantially in compliance with regulatory mandates for 
lead, mercury, PCB's and vinyl chloride. By this, we do not mean 
that companies are simply on a legally sanctioned compliance 
schedule; but rather, that they have reached or surpassed the 
goals of the regulation in question. Thus, regulation did not, 
in any instance we investigated, present an insurmountable tech-
nical problem. 
At least for the four hazards investigated, the level of 
controversy concerning regulatory demands appears to have abated 
considerably, and industry has accepted the necessity of complin 
ance. 
Within the 50 firms interviewed, the interviewees were re-
markably candid, open and willing to discuss in detail the ef-
fects of regulation on the technology in use in their companies. 
Only a very small number of companies refused to be interviewed. 
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The vast majority fe l t that the research topic was worthwhile and 
thus were glad to contribute to our effort. 
The encouraging attitude of the firms interviewed suggests 
that further empirical work to investigate the systemic and an-
ci l lary responses to regulation may be worthwhile. 
Implications for Regulatory Policy 
The model of the relationship between regulation and techno-
logical change developed in this research appears to be success-
ful in analyzing past responses of the chemical industry to envi-
ronmental and health regulation. Moreover, this conceptual 
framework may be useful both in the design of future regulations 
and in planning corporate strategy for responding to these re-
quirements. 
In the past, the chemical industry has been resilient in its 
response to significant regulatory efforts. It has reached or 
surpassed the technological requirements of regulation. In part, 
this is because the previous standards imposed appear to have 
been based on present technological feasibi l i ty or best available 
technology. But, in addition, the industry has been able to 
accelerate the development of new process technology which was 
needed for compliance. There is strong evidence that regulation 
can change the overall character of product and process innova-
tion in the industry, providing the regulations are stringent 
enough and of the right kind. 
The industry might well be viewed as being in a transition 
period between a past history of l i t t l e emphasis on environmental 
and health concern and a future pattern of much greater acti-
vity. This is evidenced by increasing managerial attention to 
these issues via both the formal establishment of environmental 
affairs units and shifting emphasis in the nature of chemical 
product design and production. Direct regulation of specific 
hazards must be seen within the context of a more general need to 
restructure the nature of chemical production technology over the 
next decade or more, if real improvements in environmental qua-
l i t y and public health are to be made. The newer regulatory 
efforts, especially those concerned with workplace hazards, con-
sumer products, and new activities by EPA under the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, may be particularly important for innovation 
both in compliance technology and in process or product re-
design. This is to be contrasted with past efforts at air and 
water guality control which focused on single pollutants as emis-
sions or effluents at the end of the production process. 
In order to succeed in achieving a more general shift in the 
nature of chemical production, regulations must be designed to 
e l i c i t the best possible technological response from the indus-
try. Regulation must be "technology forcing". The past pattern 
of basing standards on existing technology must be altered. In 
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addition, the overall stimulus for change must be strong enough 
to effect a shift in the general management approach to all pos-
sible hazards associated with production. The adoption of gene-
r ic regulations or regulation of classes of chemicals would pro-
vide a stronger impetus for change than a substance-by-substance 
approach. 
Our model of the regulation-technological change response 
implies that care must be taken in deciding whether to regulate 
the product or the process in a specific case. The technological 
response may be different. OSHA, CPSC, and EPA under their res-
pective legislative mandates can bring about radically different 
responses to a particular hazard. For example, a product safety 
regulation controlling the permissible concentration of benzene 
in industrial solvents is much more likely to change the nature 
and production technology of those solvents than regulating work-
place exposure. In addition, worker protection might more as-
suredly be achieved. This example illustrates the importance of 
selecting an appropriate regulatory strategy. This can be accom-
plished most effectively by coordination among the agencies, for 
example, through the recently-formed Interagency Regulatory 
Liaison Group. 
In the past, one of the impediments to the design of "tech-
nology forcing" regulations has been the fact that the agencies 
have relied on the regulated industries as the source of their 
information about the potential for technological change. Ac-
cordingly, compliance has been largely the adoption of "off the 
shelf" technology and has resulted in less protection of health 
and the environment than might have actually been possible. Our 
research suggests that important changes in technology can be 
encouraged by regulation. This will be the case especially if, 
in the future, both the agencies and the industry develop an 
appreciation for the complexities of the regulation-technological 
change relationship. The regulatory agencies should be aware of 
the fact that it is possible to design regulations to stimulate 
the development of new technologies whose performance exceeds the 
expectations of both industry and government. This work is in-
tended to help develop that awareness. 
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